The ECtHR offers important guidelines for establishing sports tribunals – Ali Riza et al. v. Turkey

On 28 January 2020, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) published its decision in the application of Mr. Riza et al against Turkey (“ECtHR Judgment” or “Riza et al. Judgment”). It’s worth noting that the Judgment, similar to the Pechstein Judgment. The ECtHR found that Turkey violated Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights (“the Convention”) due to the structural deficiencies of the Arbitration Committee of the Turkish Football Federation and ordered that the TFF dispute resolution instances be reformed.

Even though the case relates to the football dispute resolution instances in Turkey, the recent judgment of the ECtHR is of systemic importance and will impact on the structure and governance of sports adjudicating instances on a wider geographical scale.

The Swiss Federal Tribunal (“SFT”) has repeatedly declared that the internal instances of sports federations are not “genuine arbitral tribunals” but merely the expression of the will of the association (see 4A_492/2016, Judgment of February 7, 2017, at 3.3.3). However, the ECtHR Judgment imposes higher requirements on the “independent” tribunals of sports federations, to the extent that recourse is compulsory and there is no subsequent judicial review by an independent court. This judgment, that relates to a purely contractual matter (Mr. Riza) and a regulatory issue (Mr. Akal), comes after the Mutu and Pechstein judgment that was rendered by the ECtHR in October 2018 and related to a contractual- and a doping-related matter, respectively.

This note discusses the particular facts, the key findings of the ECtHR Judgment; the similarities and differences when compared to the Mutu and Pechstein Judgment of the ECtHR; some fundamental principles that sports tribunals must take into account in case there is no possibility for a subsequent appeal venue against their decisions; and, finally, the limits within which these high standards apply.

1) Overview of facts and various proceedings prior to the ECtHR Judgment

All Applicants contested the independence of the TFF Arbitration Committee that had previously issued decisions against them: Mr Riza (a former professional football player of dual British and Turkish nationality) was found liable for breach of contract with his former club; Mr Akal, a football referee of Turkish nationality was downgraded from top-level assistant referee to “provincial referee”; and three other Turkish amateur football players were found guilty of match-fixing charges. The facts have also been summarized in a Press Release of the Court dated 28 January 2020. Only Mr. Riza appealed to the CAS and then to the SFT, with a pending application before the ECtHR against Switzerland and these proceedings are summarized below.

The TFF Arbitration Committee Decision, the CAS Award and the SFT Judgment

Mr. Riza and his former football club (“the Club”) entered into an employment dispute. The Club started proceedings against him for breach of contract before the Turkish Football Federation (“the TFF”) Arbitration Committee. The Committee found that Mr Riza had wrongfully terminated his contract and imposed a financial sanction.

Mr. Riza appealed against the decision to the CAS in Lausanne but the latter rejected the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In this interesting CAS award – one of the first to discuss the “international dimension” of football cases – the CAS Panel held that Article 63.1 of the FIFA Statutes (2008 version), which requires national federations to confer jurisdiction to an independent and duly constituted arbitration tribunal, could not be regarded as an arbitration clause in favour of CAS for national disputes per se. By the same token, claims regarding the lack of independence of the national sports tribunals raised by Mr. Riza (as they were also – successfully – raised before the ECtHR) could not give rise to the jurisdiction of the CAS automatically (see CAS 2010/A/1996, para. 50).

According to the CAS Panel, the TFF Rules provided for an appeal to the CAS only under specific requirements, including the existence of an «international dimension». It found that this condition was not met by the sole fact that Mr. Riza was a dual (British and Turkish) national. This was confirmed by the SFT in the subsequent SFT judgment 4A_404/A2010 (see below, at 4.1.3 and 4.3.3.2).

The ensuing motion to set aside the CAS award was equally dismissed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal (“the SFT”). (see 4A_404/2010, judgment of April 19, 2011).

Ali Riza v. Switzerland

Following the dismissal of his appeal by the SFT, Mr. Riza lodged a complaint (no. 74989/11) against Switzerland before the ECtHR, which is still pending. The claims raised in this application related to alleged violations of Article 6 § 1 ECtHR with respect to the CAS and SFT proceedings and his access to courts because the CAS found that it lacked jurisdiction (see the ECtHR Judgment, para. 24). Mr. Riza also claimed violation of his right to a public hearing before the CAS and the SFT and various violations of his right to a fair hearing (equality of arms) before the SFT because the other parties were granted five times more time to file their answer than he had to file his motion.

2)The ECtHR Judgment – Some key Takeaways

Non-Applicability of Article 6 § 1 on the Amateur Football Players’ complaints

The Amateur Players’ case related to proceedings before the TFF against them with match-fixing charges. Both the first instance decision by the Amateur Football Disciplinary Committee of the TFF and the Arbitration Committee found that the Amateur Players had committed the disciplinary offence of “influencing the match result” and were banned from any football-related activities for a year.

However, Article 6 § 1 does not automatically apply to all cases. The charges imposed on the Amateur Football Players were, at the material time, considered as a “disciplinary offence” and not a criminal charge under that provision (see the ECtHR Judgment, para. 154).

Viewed from the angle of civil rights and obligations (an autonomous concept that is not interpreted according to recourse to any national law (i.e. Turkish law), see the ECtHR Judgment, para. 150) and even though disciplinary proceedings involving the right to practice a profession fall within the scope of “civil rights and obligations” under Article 6, amateur football was considered to be a non-remunerated activity. Moreover, the Amateur Players failed to adduce evidence regarding salaries (or any pecuniary losses under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 13 ECHR).

As a result, the ECtHR rejected the Amateur Players’ complaints under Article 6 § 1 as inadmissible (see Article 35 § 3 and 35 § 4 of the Convention; see the ECtHR Judgment, para. 157).

The ECtHR Findings – a Comparison to the Mutu and Pechstein Judgment

All Applicants claimed that the decisions rendered against them by the TFF Arbitration Committee violated Article 6 § 1 of the Convention relating to the right to a fair hearing and access to court. In this regard, all Applicants alleged that the TFF Arbitration Committee proceedings lacked independence and impartiality.

Article 6 § 1 of the Convention provides that “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law” (emphasis added).

All judgments (specifically, the Riza et al and the Mutu and Pechstein Judgment) tackled, among other grounds, the structural independence of an arbitral institution (the Arbitration Committee and the CAS, respectively) based on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

In Riza et al., the TFF Arbitration Committee had clear structural deficiencies that constituted, according to the unanimous view of the Chamber, a clear violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In the interesting, partly concurring partly dissenting opinion of Judge Bošnjak (annexed to the main ECtHR Judgment), the sole dissenting Judge acknowledged that two of the grounds (i.e. the lack of immunity from actions brought against the members and the lack of rules fixing the term of office of the members) would suffice for a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (at para. 5).

In essence, the ECtHR found that at the material time of the Applicants’ proceedings before the TFF Arbitration Committee, the latter had exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction over the respective football disputes brought by Mr Riza and Mr Akal and decided in a final and binding way (without a possibility to appeal to an independent court). Therefore such a Committee had to provide the same safeguards as guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

a) The “Compulsory” Character of the Arbitration and the Waiver to contest the Tribunal’s Independence

Similar to the Mutu and Pechstein Judgment, the ECtHR drew a distinction between voluntary and compulsory arbitration. In the latter case, all the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 should be safeguarded (see the ECtHR Judgment, para. 174). Unlike the Pechstein case, however, the “compulsory” recourse to the TFF Arbitration Committee was not even disputed by the parties in the Riza et al. Judgment (see the Mutu and Pechstein Judgment, para. 115).

In the case of Mr. Mutu, the ECtHR held that, even though there was not forced arbitration, Mr. Mutu had not unequivocally waived his right to challenge the independence of CAS, therefore the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 should also be safeguarded (see the ECtHR Judgment, para. 176. See the Mutu and Pechstein Judgment, paras. 120 and 123).

b) Composition of the Members of the Arbitration Committee and Balance of Powers

Contrary to the Mutu and Pechstein Judgment (which related to the CAS and not the TFF Arbitration Committee), the ECtHR found in the Riza et al. Judgment that the guarantees to protect the members of the Committee from outside pressure, and in particular from the TFF Board of Directors, were insufficient: the Board, which largely consisted of representatives of football clubs, appointed the members of the Arbitration Committee.

The ECtHR put great emphasis on the balance of powers within the Board and its influence over the members of the Arbitration Committee (in the contractual case of Mr. Riza) or the drafting of rules of the Referee Committee (in the case of regulatory nature of Mr. Akal). This legitimate doubt as to the members’ independence and impartiality was sufficient for the ECtHR to admit a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, even though this view was not shared by the dissenting Judge.

The Mutu and Pechstein Judgment also dealt with the issue of structural imbalance between athletes and federations when it comes to appointing the CAS arbitrators. Nevertheless, even though the ECtHR acknowledged that sports federations could have a certain influence on the selection mechanism of the CAS Arbitrators to become part of the list, it could not conclude based on this element only that the arbitrators on the CAS list could not be regarded as independent and impartial vis-à-vis these federations.

All judgments (specifically, the Riza et al and the Mutu and Pechstein Judgment) tackled, among other grounds, the structural independence of an arbitral institution (the Arbitration Committee and the CAS, respectively) based on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

In Riza et al., the TFF Arbitration Committee had clear structural deficiencies that constituted, according to the unanimous view of the Chamber, a clear violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

In essence, the ECtHR found that at the material time of the Applicants’ proceedings before the TFF Arbitration Committee, the latter had exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction over the respective football disputes brought by Mr Riza and Mr Akal and decided in a final and binding way (without a possibility to appeal to an independent court). Therefore such a Committee had to provide the same safeguards as guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

a) The “Compulsory” Character of the Arbitration and the Waiver to contest the Tribunal’s Independence

Similar to the Mutu and Pechstein Judgment, the ECtHR drew a distinction between voluntary and compulsory arbitration. In the latter case, all the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 should be safeguarded.  Unlike the Pechstein case, however, the “compulsory” recourse to the TFF Arbitration Committee was not even disputed by the parties in the Riza et al. Judgment.

In the case of Mr. Mutu, the ECtHR held that, even though there was not forced arbitration, Mr. Mutu had not unequivocally waived his right to challenge the independence of CAS, therefore the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 should also be safeguarded.

b) Composition of the Members of the Arbitration Committee and Balance of Powers

Contrary to the Mutu and Pechstein Judgment (which related to the CAS and not the TFF Arbitration Committee),  the ECtHR found in the Riza et al. Judgment that the guarantees to protect the members of the Committee from outside pressure,  and in particular from the TFF Board of Directors, were insufficient: the Board, which largely consisted of representatives of football clubs, appointed the members of the Arbitration Committee (see the ECtHR Judgment, para. 210 f. It is worth noting that in his Disssenting Opinion, Judge Bošnjak considers that this is not a sufficient criterion for a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, see paras. 6-7).

The ECtHR put great emphasis on the balance of powers within the Board and its influence over the members of the Arbitration Committee (in the contractual case of Mr. Riza)  or the drafting of rules of the Referee Committee (in the case of regulatory nature of Mr. Akal). This legitimate doubt as to the members’ independence and impartiality was sufficient for the ECtHR to admit a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, even though this view was not shared by the dissenting Judge.

The Mutu and Pechstein Judgment also dealt with the issue of structural imbalance between athletes and federations when it comes to appointing the CAS arbitrators. Nevertheless, even though the ECtHR acknowledged that sports federations could have a certain influence on the selection mechanism of the CAS Arbitrators to become part of the list, it could not conclude based on this element only that the arbitrators on the CAS list could not be regarded as independent and impartial vis-à-vis these federations.

c) Terms of office, Immunity and Challenge Procedure

In the Riza et al. Judgment, the ECtHR proceeded to a scrutiny of the actual members of the Arbitration Committee and found that there were a number of other problematic elements, starting with the fact that the Arbitration Committee members were not bound by rules of professional conduct. Furthermore, the Members of the Committee did not have to swear an oath or make a solemn declaration before taking up their duties nor were they protected from civil liability actions.

Another important shortcoming was that the TFF rules had no fixed terms of office for the Arbitration Committee members.

Most importantly however, the Members of the TFF Arbitration Committee did not have to disclose circumstances affecting their independence and impartiality, whereas there was no specific procedure to deal with challenges to a member on those grounds. In this respect, it’s interesting to note that general provisions imposing on members of the Committee a duty to decide in an independent and impartial manner would not necessarily suffice without a specific obligation of disclosure and independence in each case but also a procedure foreseen in case of challenges. The ECtHR compared the TFF Arbitration Committee to the CAS, which provides for a detailed challenge procedure.

Similar to the Riza et al. Judgment, the Mutu and Pechstein judgment scrutinized the terms of office under the CAS Code. Specifically, the appointment of CAS arbitrators is on a four year –renewable – term, without limitation as to the number of terms, while the ICAS Board has the power to remove arbitrators based on Article R35 of the CAS Code. However, and this could be the main difference between Riza et al. and the Mutu and Pechstein Judgment, the CAS list of arbitrators included at that time more than 300 arbitrators, while the Arbitration Committee is composed of a Chairman, 6 principal and 6 substitute Members.

Furthermore, Ms Pechstein did not raise doubts as to the lack of objective independence and impartiality of the totality of CAS arbitrators on the CAS list but only challenged the president of her panel, without further substantiating her allegations. Mr Mutu had also challenged the independence of the President of the Panel and one of the Arbitrators, but his complaints were dismissed by the ECtHR. Inversely, the Applicants in the Riza et al. Judgment did not raise doubts as to the subjective impartiality of any member of the Arbitration Committee but only questioned their independence and objective impartiality.

A further difference between the two cases relates to the question of absence of a public hearing (in the case of Ms. Pechstein), which was not even raised in the Riza et al. Judgment (see the Pechstein Judgment, para. 169). The ECtHR concluded that the absence of a public hearing (even though this was validly requested by Ms. Pechstein) constituted a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, while limiting the scope of such guarantee to specific cases (disciplinary cases; cases involving natural persons; matters not strictly limited to technical legal issues, etc.).

Finally, similar to the Mutu and Pechstein case, the financing of the TFF Arbitration Committee by the TFF was not found to be a sufficient element to demonstrate lack of independence (see the ECtHR Judgment, para. 214; see the Mutu & Pechstein Judgment, para. 151).

d) The Importance of the “Finality” of the Decisions of the Arbitration Committee

The fact that the decisions of the Arbitration Committee (and, more generally, the decisions of all sports tribunals) were final was also decisive in the Riza et al. Judgment. The pertinent provisions of the Constitution on the development of sports provided that “(…) Decisions of arbitration committees are final and shall not be appealed to any judicial authority” (see the ECtHR Judgment, para. 105).

Most importantly, however, the TFF Statutes provided that the Arbitration Committee decisions were not amenable to review by any authority, excluding even the possibility to file a motion to set aside an arbitral award (for exhaustively enumerated reasons) with the Supreme Court of the seat of the arbitral tribunal (see e.g. the procedure set out in Art. 190 ff. of the Swiss PILA and the possibility to have a waiver). However, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has held that such waivers are unenforceable and cannot be used against athletes in case of a (compulsory) arbitration clause in the regulations of the sports federation (see the SFT Judgment 4P.172/2006, Judgment of 22 March 2007 (Cañas v. ATP Tour), at 4.3.2.1 ff., in particular at 4.4.2 in fine).

3) Criteria established from the ECtHR Judgment for “independent and impartial tribunals”

Criteria of independence & impartiality of sports tribunals (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention)

The ECtHR Judgment, read in conjunction with the Mutu and Pechstein Judgment, may offer important guidance as to the steps to take when establishing “independent and impartial tribunals established by law”  to the extent that recourse to such tribunals is compulsory and there is no right to a de novo judicial review. It should be reminded that the ECtHR Judgment (like the Mutu and Pechstein Judgment) was published almost 10 years after the filing of the first application, which is problematic especially in view of the fact that the ECtHR dealt with “fair hearing” and “access to courts” complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. These key elements include, but are not limited to, the following:

The tribunal’s board should be entirely independent from the arbitrators’ roster;

There should be clear terms of office, ideally not aligned with the Board’s members

The arbitrators should disclose any conditions likely to affect their independence or impartiality on any given case (a general duty of independence signed in the beginning of the term or a general provision in the rules would clearly be insufficient)

A formal challenge procedure (similar to the one at the CAS under Article R34 CAS Code) should be put in place.

There should be a certain balance in the constitution of the panel members in order to ensure the sufficient representation of athletes

In view of the acknowledgement of the advantages of sports disputes resolution by specialized instances (also for purely contractual cases), the distinction between “doping-related” cases (where the parties seize the CAS based on the WADA Code) and “contractual cases” (in the case of Mr. Riza) or “regulatory” cases (in the case of the referee – Mr. Akal) becomes less important, with the criterion of “forced” or “compulsory” arbitration becoming the predominant one to define the arbitral tribunal’s obligations and criteria to comply with.

One must keep in mind that it is not necessary for all sports disputes tribunals to comply with these conditions. As the SFT has acknowledged, the judicial instances of sports federations are not “arbitral tribunals” (see 4A_492/2016, Judgment of February 7, 2017, at 3.3.3). The stricter standards of Article 6 § 1 apply to “independent arbitral tribunals” where recourse is compulsory (or there is no unequivocal waiver of challenge of the tribunal’s independence) and there is no subsequent judicial review.

These standards would not necessarily apply in case there is an appeal to a “true court of arbitration”, for example, the CAS, as found by the Swiss Federal Tribunal but also by the ECtHR in the Pechstein Judgment or a court that can guarantee an independent judicial review. Therefore, the finality of the decision of a sports tribunal is the decisive criterion for determining whether the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention should be respected.

Finally, the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention do not seem to apply to purely amateur athletes, to the extent that such activity falls neither under the “civil” head nor the “criminal” head of the provision.

Semenya v. Switzerland, Application no. 10934/21 / Judgment of the ECHR Grand Chamber of 10 July 2025

1. Facts & procedural history

Following the adoption, by World Athletics, of the “DSD Regulations”, South African champion Caster Semenya (Semenya, the Athlete) was excluded from international women’s middle-distance races unless she medically – or surgically – lowered her naturally high testosterone levels. The Athlete lost before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in April 2019 and the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (SFT) in 2020 (see my note here) and subsequently filed an application against Switzerland with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In July 2023, the ECHR issued its judgment (the First Semenya Judgment) considering that Switzerland had violated Articles 8, 13, and 14 (privacy, effective remedy, non-discrimination) and indirectly Article 6 (right to a fair hearing) of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention).

Switzerland subsequently referred the case to the ECHR Grand Chamber, whose final judgment was delivered on 10 July 2025 (the Grand Chamber Semenya Judgment). Below I address some key findings of this interesting judgment -but also what was left undecided and why – along with some takeaways and potential implications for the CAS and the SFT.

2. Main legal points addressed in the Grand Chamber Semenya Judgment

As will be shown in more detail below, the Grand Chamber departed from the findings of the First Semenya Judgment and considered that the SFT had no jurisdiction over the Athlete’s substantive grievances (based on Articles 8, 13 and 14) to the extent that she is a South African athlete and the International Federation (World Athletics) is based in Monaco. As such, all these substantive violations of the Convention alleged by the Athlete were left undecided by the Grand Chamber. 

On the other side, the Grand Chamber found that Article  6 did apply, finding by fifteen votes to two that the Athlete had been deprived of her right to a fair hearing. Similar to the recent Seraing CJEU Judgment (albeit based on a different legal framework), the central point of the Grand Chamber’s analysis was the standard of effective judicial review of fundamental human rights when arbitration is compulsory: in so doing, the Grand Chamber included a large number of references to its own case law (Mutu & Pechstein v. Switzerland) but also to the case law of the CJEU, in particular the ISU Judgment (when it comes to the standard of effective judicial review of EU public policy provisions).

The Grand Chamber considered that the SFT, in the particular circumstances of the case (where fundamental civil rights of bodily integrity, dignity and discrimination are at stake) should have conducted a “particularly rigorous examination” instead of the narrow control through the public policy angle, which however is a well-established and longstanding practice of the SFT under Article 190 para. 2 (e) PILA.

3. Compulsory arbitration and effective judicial review: Another consequence of compulsory arbitration under Article 6 ECHR?

Similar to previous ECHR and CJEU judgments (Mutu & Pechstein v. Switzerland, ISU v. Commission, Seraing v. FIFA) the decisive argument for the Grand Chamber’s finding was the compulsory character of arbitration.

The Grand Chamber albeit recalled the numerous advantages of arbitration and, more specifically, sports arbitration (§ 195 ff.) but also the findings of its Mutu & Pechstein Judgment when it comes to the advantages of sports arbitration (“a specialized body which is able to give a ruling swiftly and inexpensively”, “recourse to a single and specialized international arbitral tribunal facilitates a certain procedural uniformity and strengthens legal certainty” § 199). However, the Grand Chamber also noted the regulatory character of (private) sports federations and the structural imbalance between sportspersons and sport governing bodies in the international sports arbitration system that would justify an enhanced review of the CAS awards by the SFT, which did not occur in this case. Among others, the Grand Chamber criticized the SFT for simply rejecting, without thoroughly examining, the Athlete’s arguments based on the SFT Matuzalem Judgment  (the only judgment where the SFT accepted a violation of substantive public policy), even though both cases bore significant similarities (Grand Chamber Semenya Judgment, § 235). 

Accordingly, in those cases where the athletes are compelled to bring their case to the CAS (compulsory arbitration), when fundamental civil rights are involved, the review by the SFT should be “particularly rigorous” as opposed to the very strict control within the realms of public policy shown by the SFT so far. The SFT will therefore need to impose higher scrutiny standars – again not for all CAS awards but for those cases involving compulsory arbitration and fundamental human rights. 

3. What was left undecided and what happens next

As seen above, the substantive claims of Semenya, i.e. whether the DSD regulations themselves are discriminatory or violate privacy (Articles 8, 13 and 14), were left undecided by the Grand Chamber, considering that their substantive assessment was reserved for domestic or sports tribunals. The Grand Chamber thus (rightly, in my opinion) departed from the First Semenya Judgment on the extraterritorial aspects of the case and accepted that only the arbitration proceedings had taken place in Switzerland (hence the territorial link to Article 6, relating exclusively to procedural rights). Accordingly, neither the events in question (Athlete’s ineligibility following the DSD Regulations) took place in Switzerland nor the parties were Swiss residents or nationals, and Switzerland had no influence on the activities of World Athletics, itself based in Monaco (Grand Chamber Judgment, § 136 ff). Interestingly, the Grand Chamber differentiated this case from the Platini ECHR Judgment, where FIFA was based in Switzerland. Moreover, the compulsory arbitration argument raised by the Athlete was not sufficient to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction (§ 149).

The Grand Chamber further refused to review the Athlete’s claim based on Article 3 of the Convention to the extent that this was already found inadmissible in the First Semenya Judgment. 

Another noteworthy element was that the claim questioning the independence of the CAS was also not reviewed by the Grand Chamber because the Athlete, in her application to the ECHR, had merely relied on Article 6 para. 1 and Article 13 of the Convention arguing a lack of effective remedy rather than a lack of access to an independent and impartial tribunal (Grand Chamber Semenya Judgment, § 87-89).  

4. Concluding remarks

The case is not over, as it will return to the SFT which will conduct the “particularly vigorous review” of the CAS award as dictated by the Grand Chamber. The DSD will remain in force as the Grand Chamber did not invalidate them. Even if the SFT concludes that the CAS Panel violated public policy by not invalidating the DSD Regulations and finding violations of the Convention, the CAS award could be annulled but the DSD Regulations as such would not be automatically invalidated. Meanwhile, the World Athletics Council approved in March 2025 a reform of its eligibility framework, replacing the contested testosterone-suppression regime for DSD athletes with a one-time SRY gene test, applicable from 1 September 2025. The test, determines the Y chromosome and establishes a biological rather than a hormonal criterion for participation in the female category at world ranking competitions. Unlike the previous DSD Regulations, which required lowering the athletes’ testosterone levels in order to be eligible to compete, a positive SRY result excludes the athlete from elite female competition, irrespective of hormonal treatment. This regulatory change will likely have consequences for the broader legal debate between sporting fairness and fundamental rights.

It is undeniable that the Semenya Grand Chamber Judgment is important to the extent that it now reframes the level of judicial review in compulsory sports arbitration. Even though the Grand Chamber Semenya Judgment does not directly affect the CAS, the latter is still indirectly concerned in that it will be subject to a more robust judicial review of its awards by the SFT. It seems that athletes and other parties challenging rules on the basis of violation of fundamental human rights in compulsory arbitration proceedings will have the right of an extended review by the SFT, something that was denied . 

The “particularly rigorous” examination expressed by the Grand Chamber will still need to be tested in practice: will it be more akin to the control of “arbitrariness” (a wider standard of review of manifestly unjustified decisions applicable to domestic arbitration only) or an even more thorough control of the Convention’s fundamental rights? The Grand Chamber criticised in particular the narrow scope of public policy according to the SFT, which is only violated if the consequences of the award (and therefore not the assessment of the arbitral tribunal) infringe public policy. Interestingly, pending the Semenya case before the Grand Chamber, the SFT showed reluctant to accept a direct application of the ECHR provisions – beyond the exhaustively enumerated grounds of Article 190 para. 2 PILA (see my note here). In any event, the SFT can still not be converted into an appellate tribunal or perform a de novo examination. 

All in all, this new judgment is a welcome development to the extent that it raises the bar of review by the SFT but does not necessarily imply a further or significant delay of CAS awards or fragmentation of the centralized sports dispute resolution system by allowing claims in different fora (as the Seraing CJEU Judgment did).