Joined Cases C‑424/24 and C‑425/24, Requests for a Preliminary Ruling from the Lazio Administrative Court, FIGC & CONI
In his – interesting but not really surprising – Opinion issued just before Christmas, Advocate General (AG) Spielmann essentially considers that competent national courts must be able to annul unlawful sanctions imposed by sports federations and, where appropriate, grant interim measures in line with the principle of effective judicial review under EU law.
Factual and Procedural Background
The underlying cases concern a former chairman and a former administrator of professional football club Juventus FC, who were sanctioned by the Italian Football Federation (FIGC) for having participated in a system of artificial capital gains, resulting in the declaration of profits and assets greater than the real ones. The FIGC Appeal Tribunal prohibited them from carrying on any professional activity in Italian football for two years; this sanction was extended worldwide by FIFA and confirmed by the Italian National Olympic Committee (CONI).
Following a further challenge before the Administrative Court of Lazio, the latter stated that national law – providing for an enhanced autonomy of sports federations – does not allow to annul or suspend a sports disciplinary sanction, but only award financial compensation if the sanction is found unlawful.
Referral to the CJEU and the AG Spielmann Opinion
The Italian court therefore referred the case to the CJEU, asking whether that system is compatible with EU law, in particular with regard to the right to effective judicial review. The referring court also asked the CJEU whether national legislation allowing sports tribunals to impose on the club manager a sanction prohibiting them from exercising any professional activity in Italian football for two years is compatible with the free movement of people and free competition (Arts. 45, 56, 101 and 102 TFEU).
AG Spielmann considered that the admissibility threshold was met as the matter was “capable of causing cross-border effects” (§ 50). It was still found that EU rules on the free movement of persons do not preclude national legislation allowing disciplinary sanctions, provided that there is justification (e.g. integrity of sporting competitions) and such legislation is based on transparent, objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria. Nothing new here as the Opinion seems to reiterate the criteria of the European Superleague (C-333/21) and the FIFA (C-650/22) Judgments (cf. 68 of the Opinion). There is further no evidence that such individual sanctions may distort competition or lead to an abuse of dominant position (§ 59).
At the same time, AG Spielmann considered that national courts should be able to annul unlawful sporting sanctions and grant interim measures as needed, in line with the right to effective judicial protection under EU law. An important caveat the AG’s view rests on the assumption that review by the Italian administrative courts constitutes the only review carried out by a body qualifying as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of EU law. This assessment is left to the referring court.
Consequently, if the disciplinary body that imposed the sanction were to qualify as a “court of tribunal” under EU law, national legislation excluding further review would not, as such, be incompatible with EU law. In this respect, the Opinion seems to refer to some findings of the Seraing Judgment on the effective judicial review (see my notes on the AG Opinion and the CJEU Seraing Judgment).
Some Preliminary Remarks
This Opinion – not binding on the CJEU – is interesting but not surprising. It builds upon previous judgments delineating the boundaries of sporting autonomy (cf. European Super League, Seraing). Most interestingly, it incorporates into its discussion on effective judicial review under EU law the criteria relating to the independence of a tribunal as established by the ECHR in Ali Riza v. Turkey Judgment (see my note on the Ali Riza v. Turkey ECHR Judgment).
There is an increasing reliance on references and comparisons to Art. 6 para. 1 of the Convention, which is logical to the extent that the determination of a “court or tribunal” under EU law is similar to the one of a “tribunal établi par la loi” under the Convention (particularly in terms of the independence of the court). As AG Spielmann notes (§ 105), the right to effective judicial protection corresponds to the right guaranteed under Art. 6 para. 1 of the Convention and has the same meaning. In this respect, the Opinion reiterates the analysis carried out in Ali Riza v. Turkey and applies the same test to the members of the Italian sports tribunals, examining their independence in light of factors such as remuneration, the existence of challenge procedures, and the predominant presence of club or sports federation representatives on their panels (§ 107 – 112).
The decisive point, therefore, is that the AG’s conclusions on review powers and interim relief ultimately depend on whether the referring court finds that the judicial bodies established under Italian sports law qualify as a “court or tribunal” within the meaning of EU law (§ 72, 113).
