As the year comes to an end, this compilation reflects my selection of the SFT judgments in sports arbitration focusing on jurisdiction, due process, public policy, and revision of CAS awards.
2025 was rich in SFT findings regarding CAS’ jurisdiction. In two important judgments, the SFT clarified and reconfirmed the scope of the arbitration agreement in favour of the FIFA tribunal vis-à-vis state courts. Accordingly, FIFA’s jurisdiction under Art. 22 para. 1 (b) RSTP is default for international-dimension disputes but not exclusive, and the parties may validly opt-out or seize national courts for the specific category of labour-law disputes (see my notes on 4A_64/2025 and 4A_92/2025). The SFT also clafiried the admissibility threshold for review of the FIFA jurisdiction by the SFT (see my note on 4A_12/2025), which must be raised during the CAS proceedings, even though it is not necessary to explicitly object at the outset of the FIFA proceedings (see my note on 4A_92/2025).
In another judgment, the SFT held that it is immaterial for the validity of the arbitration agreement that an agent lacked the required Swiss licence under the national laws: so long as the foreign seat of the agent is established, alleged breaches of Swiss employment-placement licensing rules cannot retroactively alter the international character of the relationship or invalidate an otherwise autonomous arbitration clause governed by Art. 178 PILA, nor render the dispute non-arbitrable under Art. 177 para. 1) PILA (see my note on 4A_616/2024).
In an interesting dispute related to the extension of the arbitration agreement to non-signatories due to alleged sporting succession, the SFT held that sporting succession is not recognized as a Swiss legal institution (see my note on 4A_188/2025): The fact that the SFT has found sporting succession to be in line with international public policy does not render it part of the Swiss legal order for jurisdictional purposes, limiting thus the effect of sporting succession – or other concepts of lex sportiva – when it comes to the interpretation of arbitration agreements under Art. 178 PILA. In another dispute, the SFT clarified the consequences of the distinction between admissibility and jurisdiction in multi-tier (FIFA & CAS) dispute resolution clauses: accordingly, when a case is rejected by FIFA as being time-bared, the parties cannot bring the claim to CAS and thus circumvent an agreed jurisdiction hierarchy by allowing time limits to lapse (see my note on 4A_230/2025).
With respect to the violation of public policy, the SFT reiterated on numerous occasions that it must be the outcome of the award – and not the panel’s reasoning – that violates public policy, showing the high admissibility threshold for such grievance (see e.g. my notes on 4A_616/2024, 4A_608/2024, and 4A_28/2025). In 2025, and prior to the ECHR Grand Chamber judgment in Semenya v. Switzerland issued in July 2025, the SFT still denied to apply directly the ECHR provisions and repeated that these guarantees fall within the restrictive scope of Art. 190 para. 2 (e) PILA (see my notes on 4A_682/2024 and 4A_544/2024). It is equally found inadmissible to reiterate due process grounds separately invoking Art. 6 ECHR (4A_474/2024). It is now settled federal case law that criminal law principles are not directly applicable in disciplinary proceedings (see my notes on 4A_682/2024 and 4A_544/2024;4A_474/2024). Furthermore, the disregard of a contractual provision regarding liquidated damages is not violating public policy /pacta sunt servanda when the arbitral tribunal considers said provision as void (see my note on SFT 4A_638/2024).
Moreover, 2025 marked numerous alleged violations of the parties’ right to be heard, which were all dismissed by the SFT: accordingly, there is no such violation when the panel (only) implicitly considers and rejects raised arguments (see my notes on 4A_608/2024 and 4A_168/2025; on arguments regarding the reliability and authenticity of the LIMS evidence, see my note on 4A_544/2024); objections to the weighing of testimony typically amount to inadmissible appellate criticism (see my note on 4A_28/2025). The CAS is further not obliged to highlight specific elements of the file relied upon so long as they were on record and discussed at the hearing (see my note on 4A_474/2024).
Finally, the SFT issued two interesting cases regarding requests for revision of CAS Awards under Art. 190a PILA: the first was filed by Russian figure skater Kamila Valieva and relied on an undisclosed expert report allegedly withheld by RUSADA and WADA during the CAS proceedings: the SFT dismissed the request considering that there was no procedural fraud and not a basis to reopen the CAS Award (see my note on 4A_654/2024). In the second, published in December 2025, the SFT admitted the request for revision in view of a final state court decision establishing forgery of a document linked to the outcome of the CAS award (see my note on 4A_268/2025).
Jurisdiction – Football (contractual)
A football employment dispute arising from the unilateral termination of a Hungarian player’s contract governed by the widely debated “Clause 49”. While the FIFA tribunal accepted its jurisdiction, the CAS found that it lacked jurisdiction and said award was later confirmed by the SFT. In essence, the SFT held that CAS, as an appellate body, could not extend its jurisdiction beyond that of the FIFA DRC; moreover, FIFA jurisdiction under Art. 22 para. 1 (b) RSTP is not absolute nor exclusive but subject to the parties’ contractual choice of forum, including state courts. The SFT further upheld the CAS’s interpretation of Clause 49 as conferring jurisdiction on the Hungarian Administrative and Labour Court for labour-law disputes and on a sports arbitration body only for other types of disputes, stressing that a literal and contextual reading of the clause, the player’s experience, and the absence of structural imbalance supported the conclusion that the parties validly opted for state court jurisdiction. This was an opportunity for the SFT to reiterate its restrictive approach to waivers of state court jurisdiction, holding that the decisive element was the clear reference to state courts irrespective of any imprecision in their designation. Moreover, FIFA’s alternative jurisdiction under Art. 22 RSTP does not prevail over a valid contractual choice of state courts.
This is an important football employment dispute arising from the termination of a Hungarian player’s contract governed by the widely litigated “Clause 49”, which provides for the jurisdiction of Hungarian state courts for labour-law disputes. In this judgment, the SFT set aside the CAS award, holding that the CAS had wrongly assumed jurisdiction in breach of Art. 190 para. 2 (b) PILA: the SFT reiterated that CAS appellate jurisdiction cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the FIFA body appealed from and depends on the existence of a valid arbitration agreement; as such, FIFA’s competence under Art. 22 para. 1 (b) RSTP is default but not absolute, and subject to the parties’ contractual choice of forum.
After interpreting Clause 49 restrictively, in line with its settled case law, the SFT held that the clause grants exclusive jurisdiction to the competent Hungarian labour courts for employment disputes, notwithstanding its imprecise wording, the use of the term “may,” the standardised nature of the clause, or the international character of the employment relationship. Therefore, the CAS had erred in treating the state-court jurisdiction as merely alternative or non-exclusive. The SFT further clarified that the distinction between voluntary and compulsory arbitration is irrelevant where the clause preserves state-court jurisdiction and that parties do not tacitly waive jurisdictional objections by silence during the FIFA proceedings, so long as these objections were validly raised at the outset of the CAS proceedings. Having found a lack of CAS jurisdiction, the SFT did not examine the subsidiary res judicata argument under Art. 190 para. 2 (e) PILA. Overall, it is now settled federal case law that now “famous” Clause 49 excludes FIFA and CAS jurisdiction in favour of Hungarian labour courts for both domestic and international employment disputes.
The case related to a football employment dispute involving a Chinese club (the Club) and an Ecuadorian player and arose from the termination of an employment contract containing an optional FIFA/CAS jurisdiction clause and parallel claims under an image rights agreement providing for exclusive CAS arbitration. Both FIFA and subsequently CAS upheld jurisdiction; the SFT dismissed the Club’s motion for erroneous findings on jurisdiction as inadmissible: it reiterated that, in principle, it may review only CAS jurisdiction – and therefore not that of the prior instance (here the FIFA DRC) – save for exceptional cases where both bodies decline jurisdiction; it also emphasised that any objection to FIFA DRC jurisdiction must be raised during the CAS proceedings; since the Club itself had appealed to CAS and had failed to challenge FIFA’s jurisdiction before the arbitral tribunal, it was precluded from doing so for the first time before the SFT, thereby reaffirming the strict procedural preclusion rules governing jurisdictional challenges in FIFA–CAS dispute resolution.
The case related to a football employment dispute involving a Chinese club (the Club) and an Ecuadorian player and arose from the termination of an employment contract containing an optional FIFA/CAS jurisdiction clause and parallel claims under an image rights agreement providing for exclusive CAS arbitration. Both FIFA and subsequently CAS upheld jurisdiction; the SFT dismissed the Club’s motion for erroneous findings on jurisdiction as inadmissible: it reiterated that, in principle, it may review only CAS jurisdiction – and therefore not that of the prior instance (here the FIFA DRC) – save for exceptional cases where both bodies decline jurisdiction; it also emphasised that any objection to FIFA DRC jurisdiction must be raised during the CAS proceedings; since the Club itself had appealed to CAS and had failed to challenge FIFA’s jurisdiction before the arbitral tribunal, it was precluded from doing so for the first time before the SFT, thereby reaffirming the strict procedural preclusion rules governing jurisdictional challenges in FIFA–CAS dispute resolution.
A cooperation agreement between two football clubs provided for FIFA as the primary forum and CAS arbitration only on a subsidiary basis if FIFA lacked jurisdiction. After FIFA declined to hear the claim as time-barred under Article 23 para. 3 FIFA RSTP, the claimant sought to seize CAS, arguing that FIFA’s refusal triggered CAS jurisdiction. Both the CAS and the SFT rejected this view, holding that FIFA’s decision was based on inadmissibility, not lack of jurisdiction, since FIFA remained competent in principle but was procedurally barred from examining the case. The SFT confirmed that a procedural time bar cannot activate CAS’s subsidiary jurisdiction and reaffirmed the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility: Parties cannot circumvent an agreed jurisdictional hierarchy in multi-tier dispute resolution clauses by allowing time limits to lapse.
Jurisdiction and Public Policy – Football (contractual)
In a football-related contractual dispute between a Swiss professional player (the Player) and his intermediaries (the Agents) arising from the early termination of exclusive player-agent agreements providing for CAS arbitration and a 10% commission on employment contracts, the SFT rejected the motion to set aside the CAS award, holding that none of the grounds invoked under Art. 190 para. 2 PILA were established: the Player challenged CAS jurisdiction (Art. 190 para. 2 (b) PILA) contending that the Agents lacked the required Swiss licence under the Arbeitsvermittlungsgesetz (AVG, LSE) and only structured their contract as “international” in order to circumvent Swiss mandatory law, rendering the arbitration clause invalid. The SFT held that it was bound by the facts as established by the CAS, in particular the Agents’ foreign seat, and alleged breaches of Swiss employment-placement licensing rules could not retroactively alter the international character of the relationship or invalidate an otherwise autonomous arbitration clause governed by Art. 178 PILA, nor render the dispute non-arbitrable under Art. 177 para. 1) PILA.
The alleged violation of procedural and substantive public policy (Art. 190 para. 2 (e) PILA), based on claims that the award enforced a void contract, disregarded employee-protection norms, or imposed a sanction akin to bribery, was likewise rejected, as the outcome – ordering payment of damages for premature termination – did not contradict fundamental principles such as pacta sunt servanda or procedural fairness, thereby reaffirming the SFT’s settled jurisprudence on the autonomy of arbitration agreements, the extremely narrow scope of ordre public review, and the prohibition on factual re-assessment at the annulment stage.
Public Policy – Football (contractual)
A football employment dispute arose after the early termination of a Portuguese coach (the Coach) by his club (the Club), with a contract including a contractual liquidated-damages clause. The SFT held that the alleged violation of public policy under Art. 190 para. 2 (e) PILA based on pacta sunt servanda was not established: the SFT reiterated that public policy review is strictly limited to whether the result of the award, and not its reasoning, contradicts fundamental legal principles. It also found that the CAS had acted consistently in holding the Club liable for termination without just cause while refusing to apply the contractual compensation clause because it conflicted with mandatory Swiss employment law (notably Art. 337c para. 1 CO in conjunction with Arts. 341 para. 1 and 362 CO). To the extent that an employee cannot validly waive rights arising from mandatory provisions during the employment relationship or shortly thereafter, the CAS was entitled to disregard Article 5 of the contract as null and void and to award a higher compensation. The SFT found no inconsistency or violation of pacta sundt servanda in the Panel’s reasoning: although the Panel initially acknowledged that the contractual clause could potentially be valid, it correctly held that, under Art. 341 para. 1 and Art. 362 CO, an employee cannot waive rights arising from mandatory legal provisions during the employment relationship or within one month after its end, and that Art. 337c CO is one such mandatory rule.
Right to be heard and Public Policy – Football (contractual)
In a football-related dispute (training compensation) arising from a player transfer processed through FIFA’s TMS and EPP system, a Latvian club (the Club) unsuccessfully sought to rely on a late-submitted waiver from the training club and saw its CAS appeal dismissed for failure to join the training club as a necessary party. The SFT subsequently rejected the motion to set aside the CAS award based on the alleged violation of the right to be heard (Art. 190 para. 2 (d) PILA), to the extent that the Club merely criticized CAS’s assessment of the facts and law and the arbitrator had implicitly but clearly addressed and rejected all arguments: as such, submissions concerning regulatory inconsistencies, the absence of a time limit for waivers and the allegedly disciplinary nature of the procedure. Importantly, criticisms of the arbitrator’s expertise were found to be irrelevant. With respect to the alleged violation of public policy (Art. 190 para. 2 (e) PILA), the SFT rejected grievances based on contractual freedom, personal freedom, pacta sunt servanda and the burden of proof, as misapplication of FIFA regulations or erroneous factual findings cannot amount to a breach of ordre public. the outcome of the award – requiring the joinder of the training club as a necessary party and disregarding a waiver filed after the final EPP – was neither arbitrary nor incompatible with fundamental Swiss legal values (see also the almost identical judgments involving other players SFT 4A_612/2024 & SFT 4A_614/2024 of 22 January 2025).
Right to be heard and public policy – Football (ethics)
In a FIFA ethics case arising from allegations of systemic sexual abuse within the Haitian Football Federation, a federation vice-president (the Official) was sanctioned with a lifetime ban and fine later upheld by CAS on the basis of protected victim testimony and corroborating evidence. The SFT dismissed the Official’s motion to set aside the CAS award, finding no violation of the right to be heard (Art. 190 para. 2 (d) PILA). More specifically, the CAS had sufficiently reasoned its decision not to hear additional alleged victims, had lawfully relied on anonymous witness testimony subject to adequate procedural safeguards, and had afforded the official an effective opportunity to participate in – and challenge – the examination of evidence, while objections to the weighing of testimony amounted to inadmissible appellate criticism. The alleged violation of procedural and substantive public policy (Art. 190 para. 2 (e) PILA) was equally dismissed, as neither claims of arbitrariness nor disagreement with the evidentiary assessment meet the stringent ordre public threshold, and the outcome – confirming a lifetime ban for serious sexual-abuse misconduct – was not incompatible with fundamental Swiss legal values, thereby reaffirming the SFT’s consistent deference to CAS fact-finding and its restrictive review of ethics-related sanctions.
Right to be heard and Public Policy (Doping)
Croatian football Player Mario Vušković (the Athlete) was sanctioned for an anti-doping rule violation following an out-of-competition test revealing rEPO in November 2022 following a CAS award that increased the first-instance sanction from two to four years. The SFT rejected the alleged violation of the Player’s right to be heard (Art. 190 para. 2 (d) PILA) as he should have expected a full review of the evidentiary record; moreover, the CAS was under no duty to highlight specific elements of the file relied upon if they were on record and discussed at the hearing. The Athlete also invoked a violation of public policy (Art. 190 para. 2 (e) PILA), based on the excessive commitments provision under Art. 27 para. 2 CC, the use of the SAR-PAGE method, the CAS panel’s reliance on technical images (without the expertise to do so), and the purported impossibility of producing exculpatory evidence due to WADA’s regulatory framework. All the pleas were rejected in line with the SFT’s settled case law recognising the CAS’s broad discretion in doping matters and the compatibility of strict liability and anti-doping evidentiary rules with ordre public; arguments relying on in dubio pro reo and lex mitior were also dismissed as inapplicable to disciplinary sanctions imposed by private sports federations and, in any event, they were not shown to be violated. The Athlete’s reliance on Art. 6 ECHR was found inadmissible to the extent that it reiterated previously rejected grounds without satisfying the strict threshold required to establish a breach of public policy.
A former elite Russian bi-athlete was sanctioned by the IBU for an anti-doping rule violation relating to the use of prohibited substance ostarine in 2013, later discovered through the LIMS data from the Moscow laboratory; his CAS appeal was dismissed and the SFT rejected the motion to set aside the CAS award: the alleged violation of the right to be heard (Art. 190 para. 2 (d) PILA) was dismissed because the CAS had comprehensively examined the evidentiary record, including the statistical arguments relied upon by the athlete, and had implicitly but clearly rejected arguments regarding the reliability and authenticity of the LIMS evidence; the alleged violation of public policy (Art. 190 para. 2 (e) PILA), based on the presumption of innocence and the principle of in dubio pro reo, was equally rejected in line with the SFT’s settled case law that criminal-law guarantees under Art. 6 ECHR do not directly apply to disciplinary proceedings conducted by private sports federations; moreover, the SFT reconfirmed the non-application of criminal law principles in disciplinary sanctions and the limitation of public policy review to the outcome – rather than the reasoning – of the CAS award, showing the limits of the SFT control in anti-doping cases relying on LIMS evidence.
In a long-term doping dispute relating to the Athlete Biological Passport (ABP) of a former Russian biathlete and Olympic medallist, the CAS ultimately confirmed an anti-doping rule violation covering the period 2010–2014 and imposed a four-year suspension with disqualification of results. The subsequent motion to the SFT for violation of public policy was also dismissed: similar to other judgments, and since the Semenya ECHR judgment was still pending before the Grand Chamber (see my note here), the SFT reiterated that Art. 6 ECHR cannot be invoked directly in challenges against international arbitration awards. Also, criminal-law principles such as the presumption of innocence and in dubio pro reo do not apply to disciplinary proceedings of private sports bodies; it further found that the CAS had not reversed the burden of proof, had assessed the ABP and genetic evidence without harbouring any reasonable doubt, and was entitled to rely on circumstantial indicators in reaching its “comfortable satisfaction”; finally, the allegation of a breach of legal certainty was dismissed, as the Athlete had been notified of the investigation well within the applicable ten-year limitation period, confirming once again the exceptionally high threshold for establishing a violation of Swiss ordre public in complex, long-running anti-doping cases.
In an anti-doping dispute involving an American elite swimmer sanctioned on the basis of abnormal ABP findings, the SFT dismissed the motion to set aside the CAS award for alleged violation of the right to be heard under Art. 190 para. 2 (d) PILA. In essence, the SFT found that the CAS panel had sufficiently considered the athlete’s key defence that the hematological abnormalities could be explained by “detraining” following a reduction in training load and a Covid-19 infection, even though it did not address this argument in detail, noting that the panel implicitly rejected the explanation by reasoning that such detraining could equally support the blood-doping hypothesis. Reiterating its settled case law, the SFT confirmed that an arbitral tribunal is not required to respond expressly to every argument, that implicit reasoning suffices where the issue has been addressed, and that Art. 190 para. 2 (d) PILA cannot be used to challenge the assessment of scientific evidence or the persuasiveness of expert testimony.
Request for Revision – Doping (dismissed)
This judgment concerns Russian figure skater Kamila Valieva’s (the Athlete) request for revision of the CAS award of 29 January 2024, imposing a four-year ineligibility for trimetazidine. The SFT dismissed the request, holding that the stringent requirements of Art. 190a PILA were not met. The Athlete had claimed that an allegedly undisclosed expert report constituted new, outcome-determinative evidence or established procedural fraud by RUSADA or WADA. The SFT rejected these arguments, noting that the report’s existence was unproven (could not constitute a pre-existing fact under Art. 190a para. 1 (a) PILA) and, in any event not conclusive as it stated that the contamination scenario was theoretically possible. In any event, the CAS had rejected the contamination defence for lack of factual proof rather than scientific uncertainty. Emphasising that revision is exceptional and cannot function as a disguised appeal or a second attempt to relitigate the merits, the SFT reaffirmed the finality of CAS awards and the high threshold for reopening international sports arbitration decisions.
Request for Revision – Football (admitted)
In 2025, the SFT exceptionally admitted a request for revision of a CAS award pursuant to Article 190a para. 1 (b) PILA, holding that the 2019 decision had been decisively influenced by criminal conduct. The case arose from a dispute between a professional footballer and his agent, in which the CAS had ordered the payment of a commission on the basis of representation contracts and an email later proven to be forged. Final Swiss criminal judgments established that the agent had fabricated the contracts and falsified the email to mislead the arbitral tribunal and obtain an undue payment. The Federal Supreme Court found a clear causal link between these criminal acts and the outcome of the arbitral award, annulled the CAS decision in its entirety, and remitted the case to CAS for a new decision. The judgment stands out as a rare but important illustration of the revision mechanism operating as an exceptional corrective measure, where the finality of arbitral awards is disregarded due to proven fraud affecting both jurisdiction and the merits.
